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Medical Testimony-Problems in
Presentation
Leo S. Karlin
[As the personal-injury lawyer prepares for trial, he almost invariably
encounters the need for utilizing expert medical testimony to establish
elements of damage and physiological causality. This phase of his preparation is at least as crucial as any other phase, and often enough is undeniably the most crucial, insofar as it can, if such testimony is handled
ineptly, bear the sole blame for an unfavorable verdict. The most
thorough investigative techniques, legal analysis, scientific
T1m AUTHOR (University of Illinois, LL.B.,
1932, De Paul College of Law) is a Chicago attorney and president of NACCA.

familiarity, and courtroom expertise will all come to naught

for the lawyer if his evidence is
unconvincing to the court or
jury. In presenting medical expert testimony, the lawyer is faced with
unique problems, some of paramount importance, the others, if not paramount, nevertheless important.] Ed.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

Much has been written and a great deal more spoken about the
problems facing the trial lawyer as he approaches the medical phases in
the trial of a personal-injury action. In all this wealth of material one
finds varied analyses of methods of selecting the proper pattern of proof,
and the choice of a psychological approach to the trier of fact, as well as
a fuller understanding of the evidentiary techniques involved.
Yet, very little attention has been paid, at least publicly, either by
trial lawyers or legal scholars, to what is perhaps the most important
of all of the facets of the presentation of medical evidence in such a
trial - problems personal to the medical witness, that is, the state of
mind, psychological posture, conception of litigation, and understanding
with which the medical witness approaches his participation in the trial.
The average trial lawyer is so deeply involved in the litigation he is
handling and in his preparation for trial, that often he does not fully take
into consideration the position in which the medical witness finds himself at this point. For lack of such proper understanding and of taking
the necessary steps to lay a foundation of complete understanding between himself and the doctor, he may too late find himself and his
client in a position in which the presentation of the medical evidence
involves substantial and insurmountable difficulties.
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The problem resolves itself into a basic and impelling need for the
injury trial lawyer to understand and reconcile the difference between

what one may call the medical evidentiary philosophy and the legal evidentiary philosophy, which affect the thinking processes of the medical
witness and the negligence lawyer in their search for a conclusion.
Medical Attitude Based on Professional Training
It is essential that the lawyer give consideration to the fact that the
process of analyzing, inferring, and concluding encountered in the medical
witness is the result of years of molding and development. From the
very first day that he commences his studies at a medical school, through
all the years of class and laboratory work, through the research period,
hospital internship, and any post-graduate work, the doctor is trained to
think and work by standards of proof that are vastly different from those
involved in the field of trial evidence. Whether the doctor is attempting
to make a differential diagnosis to determine the need or result of surgery,
the selection of the proper drug for a particular purpose, or a mode or
method of treatment, he is conditioned by the very nature of his education
and the needs of his work to seek absolute certainty. A mind so conditioned cannot be satisfied with reasonable probabilities, inconsistent inferences, some of which fairly tend to support an opinion, or a preponderance of facts that leads to a reasonable conclusion.
In the practice of medicine, dealing as it does with human health
and life, the direct and ultimate objective, which is deeply inculcated in
the very being of the doctor, is the need for a determination of the particular problem by a conclusion as certain as is humanly possible, as
close to the absolute in proof as human endeavor can make it. This is
evident from the vast amount of research that must go into the study and
evaluation of the variety of new drugs being used to combat diseases and
conditions of ill-being that for centuries were considered incurable, before a conclusion of fitness for a specific purpose is reached. The same
is true of new techniques in surgery and treatment and is undeniably to
be commended. The medical man, then, by conditioning and direction,
tends to think along lines of absolute certainty when searching for the
existence of a fact or relationship.
Legal Attitude Toward Proof
That segment of the legal profession involved in the trial of personal-injury cases, on the other hand, has been conditioned by education
and by training to a completely different philosophical approach to the
problem of proof. The very basis of the determination of the quest for
truth in injuries litigation takes as a fundamental assumption the exist-
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ence of inconsistent inferences of fact, leaving to the trier of the fact
the selection of the particular group of inferences or conclusions of fact,
which, within the framework of the standards of proof set down by
law, leads to a conclusion of "what is the truth." There is within this
concept of the attainment of a belief as to the truth in a personal-injury
case no basic requirement of absolute certainty, nor even of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial lawyer, in the handling of injury litigation, is basically concerned, within the framework of existing law, with two ultimate quantums of proof. In essence, they are requirements of meeting the test of
proof necessary for the making out of a prima fade case, and the sustaining of the burden, imposed upon him by local law, of proof of all the
issues in the case. Although the quantum of proof may vary in different
jurisdictions with relation to these two types of burden of proof, there
seems to be a basic standard that may be established as a premise.
Prima Facie Proof
The defendant's motion at the end of plaintiff's case, and again at the
end of his own case (known as a motion for a directed verdict, non-suit,
or otherwise) submits to the court the question of whether plaintiff's
evidence taken as true, together with all legitimate conclusions and inferences, fairly tends to sustain the plaintiff's cause of action.' The motion made at the end of the presentation of the entire case submits the
same question to the court, with the added right inuring to the plaintiff
of having the court consider all favorable inferences, deductions and
conclusions that may be drawn not only from the evidence adduced by
him, but also from defendant's evidence.? Thus, in both of these situations, the existence of inconsistent inferences and conclusions of fact is
assumed, with a right in the trial court to consider only the evidence
favorable to the plaintiff, with the ultimate decision resting upon the
determination of whether or not this favorable evidence and the inferences and conclusions to be derived therefrom make out a case for submission to the jury. The legal approach here is not directed toward
absolute certainty, but toward a determination of conformity with a
formula of proof within the limited requirement of the law.
Burden of Proof
It is fundamental to practically all jurisdictions that the burden of

overall proof imposed upon a plaintiff is that of supporting his side of the
1. 53 AM. Jui. Trial § 313, 349 (1945); Royal Sausage & Meat Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 99 Ohio App. 77, 117 N.E.2d 207 (1954); Cassidy v. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co., 78 Ohio App.
221, 69 N.X.2d 648 (1946).
2. 53 AM. JO.. Trial § 350 (1945); Focht v.Justis, 81 Ohio App. 297, 77 N.E.2d 506
(1947).
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issues by a preponderance of the evidence.' This burden of proof is
variously interpreted or defined by different courts of review,' but it
essentially leads to the common premise that plaintiff's evidence must be
sufficient in amount to create on the part of the court and jury the reaction that it is more convincing and acceptable as truth than the evidence appearing in contradiction of it. All of these concepts proceed on
the premise that the law wisely does not require ocular proof leading
to absolute certainty or to belief beyond all doubt, because such a degree
of proof is unattainable in civil cases as long as inconsistent inferences
may, by different minds, be derived from the same set of circumstances.5
Present Major Area of Difficulty -

Results of Trauma

The basic difference in what may be called the working philosophies
of the trial lawyer and the medical witness becomes involved in the great
majority of cases that are now reaching the trial courts. This is particularly true with relation to the question of the legal definition of
medical causation. With the tremendous advances in medical learning
and study and the great accent on publication of study results, great
strides have been made in opening new vistas to the probable relationship
of trauma and what used to be known as the obscure diseases (such as
cancer, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, infantile paralysis), the
stress diseases (formerly conceived to be strictly organic conditions involving the heart, the stomach, the intestines, and the glands of the
body), and a host of other physical and mental ills falling within the
same general classification. As to all of these conditions of ill-being there
now seems to be sufficient medical knowledge available to raise inferences of causal connection, within the legal definitions of causation in
the various jurisdictions, which satisfy the rules of factual inference well
enough to make out a question of fact for submission to the jury. These
factual circumstances, however, must, under the existing system of proof,
be placed in evidence by the medical witness.
Taking into consideration this diversity of philosophy on the question
of causation, it becomes apparent that there must be a resolution of
differences before the medical witness testifies at the trial. If such a resolution is not achieved, the resulting misconception by the medical witness
of his function in court will likely result in disaster if he testifies, and
otherwise may result in a marked hesitancy to participate actively in the
proceedings.
3. Crisafi v. Kowalski, 102 Ohio App. 421, 117 N.E.2d 465 (1954).
4. 20 AM. JUR. Evidence § 131 (1939); 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 103 (1942).
5. Odom v. Weathershee, 225 S.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 788 (1954); Spoulter v. Four Wheel
Brake Serv. Co., 99 Cal. App. 690, 222 P.2d 307 (1950); Teutrine v. Prudential Ins. Co., 331
Ill. App. 107, 72 N.E.2d 444 (1947).
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This is basically so because of the fact that the average medical witness is reluctant to express an opinion, whatever may be the legal formula
in which it is couched, until all of the medical learning is complete and
he may speak with certainty. This is true despite the fact that the state
of the learning is such that he is actually able to speak with a reasonable
degree of certainty, or couch his opinion in terms of reasonable probability, which, in essence, is all that the law requires in any event.' This
is dearly the case in all of those situations involving the determination
of the causal relation of trauma and the obscure or stress diseases. Very
often, although believing as an individual, on the basis of the factual
sequence of events present in a case, that there is a legal causal connection, the medical witness is inclined to take a contrary position as a
member of the medical profession, upon the express premise that, until
and unless the profession is able by medical research and study to determine the specific causative factor of a condition to the exclusion of
all other factors, he is, for a lack of such knowledge, unable to express
an opinion on the subject.
Function of the Medical Witness
A degree of uncertainty arises as to the proper method for the solution of the philosophy problem, depending, to some extent, upon the
particular formula in use in a jurisdiction as the vehicle by which the
question as to causation is put to the medical witness. In some states it
is held that a medical witness may testify only to whether or not there
"could or might" be a causal connection based on a reasonable degree
of medical certainty.' These jurisdictions predicate the limitation of the
form of the question upon the concept that, since the triers of fact are
to determine the ultimate question of causal connection, the medical witness can only give an advisory opinion, and that if he is permitted to
testify to an opinion of direct connection, using the word "was" or "is,"
such testimony would invade the province of the jury. In other words,
the witness usurps the function of determining the ultimate question.
On the other hand, there are jurisdictions in which the formula for
eliciting an opinion as to causal connection must be predicated upon the
question of whether there "was or is" a causal connection between the
trauma involved and the condition of ill-being.8 These jurisdictions
6. Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 429, 92 NXE.2d 1 (1950).
7. De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); see Annot., 136 A.L.R.
965, 996 (1942).
8. For collected cases, see Annor., 135 A.L.R. 512 (1941); Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
186 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1951); Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P.2d 91 (1951);
Grace v. Fassott, 67 App. Div. 443, 73 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1902). Ohio seems to follow this
doctrine; although there are no direct expressions in the cases to that effect, the decisions
do condemn the "could" rule as speculative, and require proof of probability as the basis for
the evidence; in addition thereto, the questions used in the cases, when stated, contain the "was
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proceed upon the theory that the use of the "might or could" method
leads to testimony by way of opinion that is speculative and conjectural
and not of sufficient weight to support the conclusion resulting from the
opinion rendered, and that, therefore, the more positive form of interrogation must be invoked.
A third group of jurisdictions (which seems the most logical) proceeds upon the theory that in any event the opinion of the medical witness in such cases is merely advisory to the court or jury, and that the
ultimate finding of fact is based upon the warranted inferences and conclusions to be derived from the evidence in the case apart from the
opinion of the medical witness. Under this concept it is held that the
question of causation may be propounded to the medical witness in either
form, that is to say, by the use of either the "was or is" method or the
"might or could" method, and the answer elicited is included among the
elements that the triers of fact may consider on the question of the weight
of evidence.9
It seems clear that the general trend is toward holding that such an
opinion is not a conclusive factor in the case, but one of the elements to
be considered as bearing upon the ultimate determination of medical fact.
In the light of the problem posed by these factors (which have contributed greatly to creating an honest difference of opinion among medical men as to the issue of causation), many courts have taken the position
that the question of medical causation can be well determined, even in
the absence of supporting medical opinion, on what is called the sequence-of-events theory. These jurisdictions, perhaps appreciating the
basic difference between the philosophy of the medical profession and
the philosophy of the law, have reached the conclusion, where a set of
events and circumstances appears from the evidence to lead from a trauma
of a previously healthy person to a condition of ill-being that logically
seems to relate to the initial trauma, that such a sequence of events is sufficient to raise a reasonable conclusion of causation satisfactory to the
10
law.
or is" expressions. Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 429, 92 N.E.2d 1
(1950); Pfister v. Industrial Comm'n, 139 Ohio St. 399, 40 N.E.2d 671 (1942); Drakulich
v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Ohio St. 82, 27 N.E.2d 932 (1940); Drew v. Industrial Comm'n,
136 Ohio St. 499, 26 N.E.2d 793 (1940).
9. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Person, 58 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932); Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ill.2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960); Star v. Oriole Cafeterias, 182 Md.
218 (1943).
10. For full analyses of sequence-of-events theory, see 4 NACCA L.J. 75 (1949); 6 NACCA
L.J. 41 (1951); 15 NACCA L.J. 184 (1955); 17 NACCA L.J. 66 (1956); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Person, 58 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932); Walker v. Hogue, 67 Idaho 484, 185 P.2d 708
(1947); Chicago Union Traction Co. v.May, 221 111.
530, 77 N.E. 933 (1906); Pittman v.
Pillsbury, 234 Minn. 517, 48 N.W.2d 735 (1951); Gilbert v. Law, 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d
992 (1955); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 75 A.2d 191 (1950); Ballenger v.Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40 S.E.2d 681 (1946).
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The Witness' Desire For Self-Justification
Whatever may be the state of the law in a particular jurisdiction on
the form of the examination of a medical witness as to the question of
causation, if no real attempt has been made to reconcile the basic differences of philosophy in conferences between the lawyer and the doctor,
the medical witness will approach the trial of the case with an innate
desire to justify his position. It will normally be his intention to explain
to the court and to the jury the scientific state of fact with relation to
the particular problem of causation, pointing to an ultimate conclusion
that, in the absence of absolute, precise and certain knowledge of the
exact causation of the condition of ill-being, the medical profession is
unable to form an opinion about the causal relationship between the
alleged cause and damage. Since this conclusion is basic in the thinking
of the medical witness, he feels bound to take issue with the principle of
reasonable probability in the nature of a conclusion reached by the courts
on something like the sequence-of-events theory. The strange and inconsistent part of such an attitude is that many times the medical witness, as an individual and a human-being, motivated by normal thinking
processes, will have a private opinion as to causation, which is actually
predicated upon reasonable probability, but because of a sense of obligation to the entire medical profession, he feels impelled to limit his public
opinion to the current composite learning and conclusions of the medical
profession.
When, with such a frame of mind, the medical witness enters the
court room faced with the problem of answering specific questions, depending on the jurisdiction, as to whether or not there "might or could"
be a causal connection, "was or is" a causal connection, or whether a
particular condition was the "natural and probable" result of a causative
factor, he begins to feel that he has been placed in a position in which
someone is attempting to induce him to testify in a manner contrary to
his thinking and beliefs, and that he is being kept from expressing, in his
own way, the truth as he sees it, with the result that he begins to become
hesitant and resentful, even to the extent of unconsciously assuming an
attitude of partiality. The net results of such a situation are difficulties
of presentation, misunderstanding, and unwarranted prejudice to the
client's case.
Remedial Consultations
The solution, of course, is extensive and detailed preliminary consultations between doctor and lawyer, for the purpose of clarifying differences in the thinking, and demonstrating the fairness and integrity of the
legal processes and formulae, in view of the purposes served and objec-
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tives pursued by the law. The medical witness should dearly understand
that when he is asked to give an opinion of causation concerning a subject where medical knowledge is not yet a certainty, he is not being asked
to do anything unethical, to betray his philosophy, or to involve his professional integrity. He is simply being asked to voice his private belief on
the question of reasonable probability, within the framework of what the
law permits and requires. It must be made clear to him that (in the
great majority of jurisdictions) he is not being asked to decide an ultimate issue of fact, for that is the function and province of the court or the
jury, and his opinion is merely advisory.
Preparation For Cross-Examination
The clarification of the difference in concepts between the two professions is perhaps even more important in preparing the medical witness
for cross-examination on the question of causation, than it is in preparing
him for direct examination. He must be ready to defend his expert
opinion, and not be trapped into diluting its effect by allowing to go
unchallenged a slanted comparison of his views with contradictory statements made by other medical men, standing on their professional uncertainty. In all of the problems involved with medical causation, the
capable cross-examiner will inevitably attempt to develop a medical fact
situation under the sequence-of-events theory for the purpose of engendering in the court and jury a belief in the natural probability of causation contrary to the expressed opinion of the medical witness. When the
medical witness is no longer being interrogated by someone friendly to
his side of the case, but rather the questions posed are a formalized attack
on his thinking, the difference in philosophies of the doctor and the lawyer becomes sharply and clearly delineated. The attack is often a defendant's weapon, but, to the extent that medical thinking manifests the inclination to take a positive position against causation in the absence of
absolutely certain knowledge as to the existence or causes of physical
conditions, it is the attorney for the plaintiff who finds himself in the
position of having to project this difference between the "private" and
"public" beliefs of the medical witness. Many medical subjects provide
suitable bases for demonstration, but in the field of causation relating to
cancer one can find the most clearcut illustrations.
For example, in a case tried a few years ago in Chicago, there was
involved the following unusual set of facts: It appeared that the plaintiff,
a woman of middle age, who was a voice teacher, had had an abdominal
operation some five or six months before the accident out of which the
cause of action arose. In this operation, a portion of the intestine was
removed under diagnosis of a non-malignant type of tumor; this diagnosis
was confirmed by laboratory slide-analysis and other medical tests. She
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seemed to make an uneventful recovery. At the time of the occurrence,
she was crossing a thoroughfare in the pedestrian cross-walk, when a
truck, traveling in reverse, struck her in such a way that a strong blow
was received at the site of the abdominal surgery, and injuries to the
head were sustained, diagnosed as a concussion of the brain. The recovery from the head injury was normal, but within a few months the
abdominal region developed what was diagnosed as cancer. At the time
of the trial, the issue presented was whether there could be a causal connection, either by way of precipitation or aggravation, between this condition of ill-being and the trauma sustained when she had been struck
by the truck.
On the basis of the previous and current medical information, the
attending surgeon and pathologist at the hospital gave as their opinion,
within the framework of the Illinois rule on testimony as to causation,"
that, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there could be
such a causal connection. The defense produced a very eminent medical
witness, a pathologist who was the head of the laboratory department of
one of the largest hospitals in the city and had written, lectured and
taught extensively in the field of his work. His position was what is
now referred to as the "usual approach" - that since the state of medical

knowledge was such that the profession did not as yet know specifically
what caused cancer, no doctor could give an opinion as to the medical
relationship between trauma and cancer, either by way of precipitation or
aggravation; and, for that reason, it was his confirmed opinion that there
could not be any such causal connection.
The problem with which the trial attorney for the plaintiff was confronted is dear; here was a medical witness of prestige and stature, speaking authoritatively on a subject with which he was familiar and whose
opinion obviously could carry great weight with the jury. This particular
jury was made up of ten women and two men. How to establish the sequence-of-events theory so as to show the jury that there could be or was
medical causation within the rules of the law in contrast to the notion of
certainty by which this witness was motivated was the problem that faced

the trial lawyer. He began by interrogating the witness to some degree
about his background of medical research in cancer with relation not only
to abdominal tumors but tumors in other parts of the body. Eventually

the interrogation and discussion was narrowed to the problem of cancer
of the breast (with ten women on the jury). It was developed by a series
of questions that, in the laboratory work over which the witness presided,
11. Fellows-Kimborough v. Chicago City R. Co., 272 Ill. 71, 111 N.E. 499 (1916), followed
"might or could" rule, but now modified by late decision so that either formula can be used
since considered only advisory. Clifford v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 236, 166 NXE.2d
582 (1960).
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some ten thousand tissue slides a year were examined to determine the
absence or presence of cancer. Of these slides, about four thousand
per year involved analysis of tissues of the breasts of women. Then
followed questions as to whether, when these particular slides were received by the witness there was attached to them the history given by the
patient as to the origin of the condition from which she was suffering.
The answer was that such histories usually accompanied the slides. The
doctor was then asked what percentage of the histories accompanying
the four thousand slides of breast tissue that he analyzed each year contained a history of trauma to the breast. The answer was that normally
about sixty percent or sixty-five percent of the breast tissue slides analyzed
were accompanied by a history of trauma.
In order to reach the doctor's final feeling about the sequence of
events theory involved, the lawyer then asked "Now, doctor, in reaching your conclusion as to whether or not there was any causal connection
between the trauma contained in those sixty or sixty-five percent of the
four thousand histories accompanying the slides, and the condition of
malignancy you found in the tissues on those slides, what disposition did
you make of the static and continued history of trauma, that is, how did
you eliminate that factor?" The doctor turned and looked at the jury,
perhaps knowing what was going on in the minds of the ten women
listening intently. His reply was that "on the basis of available medical
knowledge I think that every one of the persons giving such a history
was mistaken."
To one watching the reaction of that jury, made up of women who
had never gone to medical school, but who all their lives had been talking to other women - mothers, grandmothers, daughters and sisters
about problems peculiar to women, it became obvious that as ordinary
normal human beings they could now see in the facts that had been developed a reasonable probability of causal connection which the medical
witness had refused to accept.
Perhaps an even more specific example of the strangeness of the
position taken by a medical witness on the basis of his uncertainty premise
can be seen in the application of a general theory that is commonly accepted, which has been discussed at various medico-legal seminars, and
used in court. In performing any operation involving a maligancy, the
accepted procedure of removing the area of the tumor is to make the
separation incision as far as possible from the site of the tumor and as
close as possible to healthy tissue. 2 To one being apprised of this accepted method a natural question would be why it is done in this manner.
12. Cole, Recent Advances in the Treatment of Cancer Patients, 174 J. AM. MED. Ass'IN
1287 (1960).
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At a NACCA Bar Association seminar held some years ago, a discussion had been arranged between an eminent surgeon in the field of tumor
research and a trial lawyer, for the purpose of presenting the problems
involved in proof of causal connection. In the course of the discussion
the doctor took the "usual" position firmly and positively, announcing
that he would have to state ultimately that there was not or could
not be a causal relation between trauma and cancer. In the cross-discussion that followed, the trial attorney questioned the surgeon about the
method described above for the removal of a tumor from the human
body. The response was that it should be done in an encircling movement from an incision as far removed from the tumor site as possible
without sacrificing total removal. The question was then put to the
surgeon whether he would be concerned with a surgical procedure that
cut through the tumor and removed it in sections. The instantaneous
reply was that it should never be done that way, because such a procedure
would tend to disseminate the malignancy. The pointed question then
put to the surgeon was what the difference could be between the effect
of a scalpel and some other instrumentality exerting traumatic force. In
the general discussion that followed, the surgeon very dearly explained
the medical position that, although thinking as individuals could lead the
medical profession to the acceptance of the sequence-of-events theory,
their objective as an entity was such that they would have to proceed on
the basis of this quest for absolute certainty.
These examples point up what may be accomplished by trial technique, but more important, they illustrate the right of the lawyer and
layman to question the medical profession's stand outside the scope of
the profession's objectives. It seems proper, and certainly more just, for
the medical witness to voice his private feeling, that as a matter of factual
sequence, it is logical to infer causality based on reasonable probability.
Such an attitude, if it were achieved, would greatly alleviate the difficulty
in which thousands upon thousands of injured people regularly find
themselves, as a result of the want of complete medical knowledge of
causes of some physical or mental conditions of ill-being. As it is the
purpose of the law to reach a conclusion based upon reasonable inferences and probabilities, not absolute certainty, it should likewise be the
purpose of medicine, to the extent that it becomes involved in law, to
seek to help attain such an objective within the limits of available
knowledge, whether that knowledge is absolutely certain or only reasonably so.
THE PROBLEM OF COURTROOM COMMUNICATION

Without the field of medical-legal philosophy, and within the realm
of practical analysis, there are other problems facing the medical witness
and the trial lawyer that deserve attention.
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One of the most common problems, strangely enough, arises in the
cases being tried by experienced trial attorneys and learned medical witnesses. Very often, with the acquisition of medical knowledge that results from extensive work in the courtrooms, the trial lawyer is able, in
his presentation of testimony through medical witnesses, to engage in
discussion with them on very nearly the same level of expression and
thought that is usually employed by these doctors and their medical associates. Likewise, medical witnesses are wont to give testimony on a level
that is customarily used at medical seminars or medical schools. If the
trial lawyer is not conscious of these circumstances, a point is reached at
which the evidence being elicited may well be above any possible level
of understanding of the average jury. One must never lose sight of the
fact that the average American jury is comprised of a cross-section of men
and women and that, in the main, they are drawn from the working class.
This general group cannot have extensive medical background nor the
level of education with which either the experienced trial lawyer or the
medical witness is equipped.
It is thus essential that both the trial lawyer and the medical witness
be cognizant of and responsive to the need for the reduction of the
medical testimony to the level of understanding of the jury, whether the
issues involve simple or complex matters. More often than not, when
observing the trial of a case, one hears a very learned dissertation about
an injury from which a plaintiff is suffering, couched in technical medical
terms that may be understandable to the court and the participating
lawyers and doctors but which fail to convey dearly to the jury the real
significance of the injury so that it can properly evaluate it, from the
viewpoint of either the plaintiff or the defendant. The more complex
the injury and the greater the problem of medical-legal causation, the
more necessary it is to simplify the presentation of evidence so that it is
rendered in the kind of everyday language that the jury can understand.
Not long ago, during the trial of a case, a doctor had testified at
length as to the "narrowing of the intervertebral space between C-3 and
C-4, at a point below the level of the Atlas on the axis, which are made
up of C-1 and C-2, with a herniation of the nucleus pulposus." The
jury was listening intently but signs of perplexity appeared on their faces.
Finally, one of the jurors raised his hand and asked if he could pose a
question. (In Illinois jurors are not permitted to ask questions except by
agreement of counsel.) Counsel agreed to let the juror ask the doctor a
question. The juror blandly addressed himself to the doctor with "Doctor, we know that you and the lawyers understand each other when you
talk about this intervertebral disc, the spaces and this pulposus stuff, but
can you explain to us what was really wrong with the man?" This may
be an extreme example, but it clearly points to the basic need for the re-
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duction of technical testimony by explanation or analogy to common
understanding. The obligation to avoid this problem rests squarely upon
the trial lawyer in the pretrial conferences with the medical witne-ses and
in his handling of the testimony during the trial of the case.
THE USE OF VISUAL AIDS

Closely related to the foregoing problem is a consideration of the
use, in a proper case, of the available visual aids. In the field of demonstrative evidence these aids will enable the doctor to convey more dearly
to the jury a picture concept of the medical conditions being described.
Visual aids, such as reproductions of the body in skeletal form, medical
drawings, slides, and blackboard illustrations should be used when they
will more easily explain the nature of the injury.
The value of these exhibits is quite obvious, when one considers how
it is that jurors form, or attempt to form, a picture-concept of the subject
matter of the medical witness' testimony. As the witness testifies, a
multiple mental process is taking place in the minds of the jurors. Each
of them is trying to translate the technical descriptions into a mental
picture of what the juror believes the medical witness is describing. The
use of available visual aids enables the witness to convey more dearly
and expeditiously to the jury the substance of his testimony, thus eliminating the necessity of multiple mental processes otherwise taking place in
their minds, by means of direct creation of the picture-concept of the
medical condition.
The right to invoke the use of such visual aids is well established
in most jurisdictions, on the premise that a witness testifying to any scientific matter may use any object that tends to assist him in explaining the
subject matter of his testimony, so long as its use is relevant to the issues
and actually explanatory. The principle applies whatever the nature of
the visual aid is, that is, whether it be a skeletal object, medical charts,
slides, medical drawing, or illustration on a blackboard,' 8 since the purpose of use is actually the same. 4
It must be remembered that whenever any of these visual aids are
used for the purpose of illustrating the verbal testimony of the medical
witness, they are not real evidence in the sense that they are primary
13. The use of a blackboard by a medical witness for the purpose of illustrating his testimony
should not be confused with the question of the right of an attorney to use a blackboard during
argument to the jury for the purpose of presenting mathematical computations as to damages.
This involves a totally different problem, as well as different principles of law.
14. Chicago & A. Ry. v. Walker, 217 I1. 605, 75 N.E. 520 (1905); Smith v. Ohio Oil Co.,
10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134 N.E.2d 526 (1956) (skeletal objects); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio
App. 345, 386, 128 N-E.2d 471, 497 (1955), af'd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340
(1956) (slides & projector); Slow Dev. Co. v. Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890 (1960)
(medical drawings); People v. Fisher, 340 I1. 216, 241, 172 N.E.2d 743, 754 (1930); State
v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348, 74 Pac. 1114 (1904) (blackboard to illustrate).
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exhibits; they fall rather into that class of evidence usually referred to
as auxiliary or adjunct evidence. This is so because the object used is,
in the usual situation, a skeleton, chart, slide, or drawing of a normal
part of the anatomy and not a true reproduction of the injured part of
the body as such. The object is marked and identified as an exhibit so
that the record may demonstrate that it is being used by way of explanation, but it does not become an exhibit in evidence, for use by the court
or jury in considering a finding or verdict. Such an object could be considered as a primary or original exhibit in evidence, it would seem, only
in the case of a medical drawing constituting a tracing of an X ray, in
which the details of injury are reproduced. However, in the ordinary
medical drawing, for the purpose of illustration, there is added to the
tracing of the X ray the outlines of a normal human body, or part of a
body, together with other anatomy, to aid in explaining the relationship
of the bone injury to the other parts of the anatomy. In that case, the
medical drawing is no longer a true reproduction of the particular part
of the plaintiff's body and, for that reason, could be used only as auxiliary evidence under the foregoing principle, for the purpose of illustrating or explaining the testimony of the medical witness.
DISPLAY OF THE INJURY ITSELF

There remains one problem, with relation to the evidence to be presented by the medical witness, that warrants serious discussion. In order
to make the testimony understandable, and the nature and extent of the
injury clear enough to evaluate, it is essential to exhibit the injured part
of the body, when possible, to the triers of the fact. This is sometimes
done before the medical witness has testified, and although in such case
it does not constitute a part of his testimony, it is very important inasmuch as it serves to illustrate and clarify it. There is respectable authority to the effect that such exhibition of the injured part of plaintiffs
body may be made during the testimony of the medical witness, in which
case he points out and explains the nature and the extent of the injury by
using that part of the plaintiff's body as his exhibit."
The right so to exhibit the injured part of the plaintiff's body seems
to be well established in the law of all of the jurisdictions in this
country. 6 The rule laid down in all of the cases seems to be that the
15. Gleason v. Hanafin, 308 Mich. 31, 13 N.W.2d 196 (1944); Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Findley, 46 Week L. Bull. (Ohio) 217 (Cir. Ct. 1901).
16. Bluebird Bakery Co. v. McCarthy, 36 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935), where jury
felt and manipulated plaintiff's skull; John Holland Gold Pen Co. v. Juengling, 2 Ohio App.
20 (1913), where part of scalp torn from plaintiff's head was preserved in alcohol and permitted to be shown to jury; Minnis v. Friend, 360 Ill. 328, 196 N.E. 191 (1935); Pittsburgh,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lightheiser, 168 Ind. 438 (1906); Schroeder v. C.R.I. & P.R., 47 Ia. 375
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plaintiff has the right to exhibit the injured part of the body to the jury
for the purpose of conveying to the jury information as to the nature
and extent of the injury, subject to the sound discretion of the court.
The unfortunate part of the statement of the rule is that the decisions do
not define how the sound discretion of the court is to be exercised. Some
of the trial courts, in a practical sense, seem to exercise that discretion
on the basis of a predetermination in their own minds of which way the
verdict of the jury should go. In other words, if it were the type of case
that the court felt was one in which the plaintiff should prevail, then
the exhibition of the injury would be permitted. If, on the other hand,
the court felt that the exhibition of a serious injury might tend to influence the jury in its determination on a close question of liability, then
the request for the exhibition would be denied. This, in essence, amounts,
in the cases in which it has been done, to an exercise by the trial court
of improper control over the verdict by rulings on evidence. Basically,
the courts should permit the exhibition of the injury if it is relevant to the
issue of damages in the case, and determine the question of the weight of
the evidence when the time comes to rule upon the jury's verdict, on
consideration of the post trial motions. At least one court has faced this
problem and recently held that the trial court does not have the right arbitrarily to refuse to permit an exhibition of the injury to the jury, unless
there appears in the record a basis for the exercise of discretion with
relation thereto.'
CONCLUSION

This discussion of the problems of presentation at trial has presupposed
an acquaintance with the sort of very complete research in the fundamentals of the causality concepts of the medical and legal fields, done by
Professor Ben Small of the Indiana University Law School'" and Albert
Averbach of New York. 9
It is hoped that the discussion will serve to project to the trial
lawyer the impact of the problems upon the everyday practice of negligence law, and to suggest the beginning of a solution. In an immediate sense, it obviously is the obligation of each trial lawyer to attempt in his relationships with the medical profession to reach a better
understanding with those medical witnesses with whom he comes in
(1877); Davis v. Antol, 212 Ky. 149, 278 S.W. 573 (1925); Garozynski v. Daniel, 190 Md.
1, 57 A.2d 339 (1947); Grove v. City of Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 78 N.E. 1033 (1893);
Wilson v. Thayer, 115 Neb. 579, 213 N.W. 966 (1927).
17. Stegall v. Carlson, 6 11. App. 2d 388, 128 NE.2d 352 (1955).
18. Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause:Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEx. L. RVB.630 (1953).
19. Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 ClW.-MAR. L. REV. 209 (1957).
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contact, and to so conduct himself in his relationships with them as to
point towards a greater understanding in the future. From a long-range
view, the real answer seems to be an attempt in some way, through the
law schools and medical schools, to inculcate in the minds of the students
the joint responsibility of both of the professions to the injured person,
a realization of their respective places in the processes of the law when
they do become involved with it, and a greater respect on the part of each
for the beliefs and opinions of the other. This attempt at understanding is already taking place between the bar associations and medical
societies in the attaining of joint standards of conduct or interprofessional
codes directed at better understanding of their mutual problems. The
positions of the two professions are actually not irreconcilable so long as
there are in each of those professions great numbers of men of understanding and dedication to the cause of the public, which both professions
serve.

